Time magazine political columnist and blogger Joe Klein has posted his reaction to a column today by David Brooks of the New York Times.
Brooks credits President Bush for his decision, in the face of enormous political pressures, to embrace the so-called surge strategy in Iraq. Klein chalks this up not to President Bush’s knowledge of tactics or strategy but to Bush’s stubbornness — while Klein, who presents himself as a man in possession of enormous knowledge and sophistication about counterinsurgency doctrine, merely happened to be wrong in his fierce opposition to it. In any event, Klein admits he was wrong in opposing the surge and has proper praise for General Petraeus, which is admirable.
OK, I'm not quite sure what to make of this. Wehner says Klein regards Bush as stubborn, and lucky in his stubborness, while Wehner regards Klein as a self-regarded COIN guru, who was wrong. Yet Klein admits he was wrong and has nice things to say about Perfect Peter.
First off, the story of the surge isn't written yet. If you think back, lo, to the dark mists of time when the surge was devised and sold, first to Bush, then to America, a "reduction in violence" wasn't to be considered evidence of success. The surge was to buy time for the Iraqi government to enact certain vital benchmarks.
Wait, let me quote the relevant portion of the Man his-own-self, George W. Bush, addressing the nation in January of 2007.
To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's constitution.
I think the quote is relevant, since it came right after President Bush said,
A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.
Now, for those of you who never spent time reading counterinsurgency theory, let me 'splain something. The surge was going to reduce hostile activity in Baghdad, that was a given. It was a given because damn few people are stupid enough to stand up to the striking force of the United States military in anything resembling a fair fight. Since we're playing "world cop" let's look at it from a police standpoint. We put 20,000 more flatfeet on the ground. That's just gonna effect crime.
Violence was also going to go down in Baghdad because everyone knew that those boots on the ground were temporary. Go read your TO&E tables for the US Army. Tell me how many combat divisions we have. Look at the reserve component. Think about troop rotation schedules.
Now, if our enemy in Baghdad is an Arabic (or Persian!) Fu-Manchu, this ain't gonna be news to him. So if you're a cunning fiend, and you know there will be a temporary increase in highly trained, decisively armed shoot'n'looters, and further that said shoot'n'looters are only going to be in town for about a year . . . what do you tell your guys to do?
Bueller? Bueller? Anyone?
You tell your posse to chill out, re-up their weapons quals, maybe a little intensive religious indoctrination, send 'em back home to the old lady for a few weeks, or months, to be with their family. Meanwhile you wheel and deal, calling old enemies and old friends and seeing what you can do to shore up your support in the 'hood to your north (or south, east, or west).
Let me be clear, here. You don't tug on Superman's cape, and you don't pick an infantry fight with the US Army (to say, ahem, nothing at all about the US Marines). In anything even resembling a fair fight, we will stack bodies like cordwood. We will run the table on them. We will hurt 'em, and bad.
So you tell your posse, "chill out, brothers" and in the meantime you let the occupying forces fall into a nice, sloppy little occupation-duty lull. And you watch them, oh my yes you do. You watch them and note that Sgt. Hernandez might be only medium-ranking among the company officers, but the troops hop to it when he says boo. You note down Sgt. Hernandez for an early bullet. You get to know exactly what time the commissary trucks make their runs.
Wait---this is obvious, right?
Remember: In an insurgency, the counterinsurgents have to win, but the insurgents only have to stay alive, and maintain some political viability.
Oh yeah---I still think that political viability in Baghdad is probably spelled "Moqtada al-Sadr."
So, basically, I think it's too early to write the story of the surge, for sure and for certain. Let's see what happens after a few combat brigades rotate back out. I mean, that's what we're waiting for, right?
Back to NRO:
But then Klein goes on to say this:
The notion that we could just waltz in and inject democracy into an extremely complicated, devout and ancient culture smacked—still smacks—of neocolonialist legerdemain. The fact that a great many Jewish neoconservatives—people like Joe Lieberman and the crowd over at Commentary—plumped for this war, and now for an even more foolish assault on Iran, raised the question of divided loyalties: using U.S. military power, U.S. lives and money, to make the world safe for Israel.
Put aside the fact that Klein himself, swept up in the success of democratic elections in Iraq in 2005, was quite sympathetic to what he now refers to as “neocolonialist legerdemain.” The “divided loyalties” charge is an ugly smear, one that ignores, among other things, the vast non-Jewish and non-neoconservative support for the Iraq war. (For example, the use of force resolution passed with 77 votes in the Senate – the overwhelming majority of which were cast by non-Jews and non-neoconservatives).
Wehner points out delicately that Klein HIMSELF was a neocolonialist back in '05! Then Wehner, frankly, loses his nut. "The “divided loyalties” charge is an ugly smear, one that ignores, among other things, the vast non-Jewish and non-neoconservative support for the Iraq war." Yeah. Hey, I'd be happy to apply the same standard to all those Arab-American foreign policy elites, checking them for dual loyalties to, oh, Saudi Arabia or (snicker) Lebanon or (chortle) Syria. Oh wait. We don't really HAVE any foreign policy elites like that, do we?
And why, exactly, is the question of "divided loyalties" a smear? Are our tribal affiliations really so shallow a thing? As a Celtic-American mixed mutt (with, doubtless, plenty else thrown into the mix!), I feel a certain tribal loyalty to Scotland, to Ireland . . . It's not exclusive, and it's not deterministic, but it's there. Sure. Why shouldn't it be?
Or is Wehner saying it's a slur to even consider that men like (the various) Kagans and (several) Kristols and Doug Feith and Wolfowitz might feel a certain, in no way reprehensible affinity for the State of Israel?
With a straight face?
Wehner continues, in a different albeit no-less-loopy vein.
And on the matter of Iran: isn’t it reasonable to assume that if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon it will pose an enormous threat not simply to Israel but to the region (including other Arab states) and the interests of America? And doesn’t it matter that Israel is among our closest allies, a nation of extraordinary achievements and virtues, and one with whom we have security agreements? This doesn’t necessarily lead one to support U.S. military strikes against Iran in order to prevent Ahmadinejad, Khamenei, & Company from possessing a nuclear weapon. If Klein is against that, fine; he should make the argument on prudential and policy grounds. But arguing that those who favor using military force against Iran and happen to be Jewish are driven by “divided loyalties” is despicable and libelous.
Whee doggies, we just need a reasonable assumption to attack them dirty Persians! I find myself asking, Is that the standard we apply? "Could be?" Why, if so, is it even a reasonable assumption? Is it because Iran has a long history of foreign aggression? (Aside from Xerxes. Gotta give Xerxes props.) Do they have, well, the Wehrmacht? Can we point to a recent event and say, "Here, this is where the Islamic Republic of Iran pursued a really reckless and destabilizing foreign policy?" If there is such an event, or events, the neocon press is not doing a good job of communicating them to me.
I think it's fair to say that a nuclear armed Teheran would dramatically reshuffle the balance of power in the Middle East. As a conservative, I'd thus rather not see them get nukes. As a Christian, I pray fervently that they don't get them. (That's because, as a Christian, I think nuclear weapons are an abomination before God, and don't think anyone should have them.) Just because I'd rather not see the Iranians be nuclear capable, though, doesn't necessarily mean I'm willing to go to war to stop them. I think the consequences of a massive series of air strikes against Iran's known or suspected nuclear sites would be, on the whole, more destabilizing and dangerous than letting them get the bomb.
I could be wrong, but that's not an unreasonable position.
Then, of course, Wehner deigns to notice the elephant in the living room (i.e., Israel---surprise!) and concludes, essentially, "and what is wrong with that?" Well, nothing---and it certainly can be argued so, from Wehner's "prudential and policy grounds." Why, then, do we not do so? Why not debate the merits of the current US relationship with Israel? What does it cost us? What could it get us? What's the worst that could happen, and how likely do we think it is? What's the best that could happen, and how likely do we think it is? I pretty much believe in the power of the marketplace of ideas (hey, Christianity's done pretty well over the past couple of millenia!), and would be game to bring the US-Israel relationship into that marketplace.
Wehner probably didn't mean that, though.
I will reiterate that I do not understand how accusations of dual loyalty could be despicable or libelous. The State of Israel exists. There is a coterie of the US foreign policy elite who are deeply supportive of Israel, and more particularly, of the policies advanced by Israel's Likud party. Some members of this coterie are Jewish. Some members of this coterie have been deeply involved with the formulation of Israeli and/or Likud strategic analysis and policy making.
Not, I say, as I put on my Seinfeld hat, that there's anything wrong with that.
Joe Klein appears to be a man who cannot control his anger and even hatred toward those with whom he has policy disagreements. It is a sad thing to witness. And those who care for Klein should do him a favor and urge him to give up blogging, which allows his unfiltered rage to make its way into print and embarrass him and the magazine for which he writes.
06/24 04:41 PM
Well, isn't that special.
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